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Biological systems are particularly prone to variation, and
the authors argue that such variation must be regarded as
important data in its own right. The authors describe a
method in which individual differences are studied within
the framework of a general theory of the population as a
whole and illustrate how this method can be used to ad-
dress three types of issues: the nature of the mechanisms
that give rise to a speciﬁc ability, such as mental imagery;
the role of psychological or biological mediators of envi-
ronmental challenges, such as the biological bases for
differences in dispositional mood; and the existence of
processes that have nonadditive effects with behavioral and
physiological variables, such as factors that modulate the
response to stress and its effects on the immune response.
V
ariation occurs around every central tendency, but
in most studies of the biological foundations of
mental processes such variation is treated as
noise—something to be minimized as much as possible and
ideally eliminated altogether (cf. Plomin & Kosslyn, 2001).
However, there is good reason not to ignore such variation
but rather to use it to gain leverage in formulating and
testing theory. Indeed, in his seminal article, Benton Un-
derwood (1975) argued that individual differences provide
a unique opportunity to test a wide range of psychological
theories (see also Lamiell, 1981). Underwood argued that
naturally occurring individual differences reveal the struc-
ture of psychological function and in fact may provide
more robust insights than many conventional group-based
methods. In this article, we extend and modify Under-
wood’s argument to show how individual differences can
play a crucial role in understanding the connections be-
tween psychology and biology.
We argue here that bridges between psychology and
biology will be easier to forge if researchers treat each
participant as an individual but conceive of individual
differences within the framework of a general character-
ization of the population as a whole. The key to this
orientation is to relate naturally occurring variation in a
particular ability or characteristic to variation in the func-
tioning of an underlying mechanism that characterizes the
species in general. We note that although all members of
the same species share the same fundamental mechanisms,
biological systems are notoriously redundant and complex,
affording many different ways to accomplish the same
goal. Thus, people (or other animals) may differ not only in
the efﬁcacy of speciﬁc mechanisms but also in the fre-
quency with which particular mechanisms are recruited
(which in turn would make some more salient than others).
If some people tend to rely on one “strategy” (i.e., combi-
nation of processes), whereas others habitually rely on
alternative strategies, pooling data from both groups may
be uninformative at best and outright misleading at worst.
Appropriately collected, group data can provide a good
starting point, but individual differences need to be re-
spected if researchers are to understand the nature of the
alternative mechanisms. These mechanisms can be charac-
terized at many levels of analysis, ranging from informa-
tion processing (which may or may not include aspects of
phenomenological experience) to the neural structures that
underlie such processing to the neuropharmacological, hor-
monal, and immune systems that regulate events in the
body and brain.
The research method advocated here rests on a con-
ﬂuence of correlational and experimental designs. This
method avoids the worst criticism of correlational studies,
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ables and do not implicate causal mechanisms. It does so
by using a theory of the general mechanism to produce
alternative accounts and then examining the variables as-
sociated with these accounts in their own right. That is,
instead of simply demonstrating a correlation between the
strength of a psychological characteristic or behavior and
variation in the workings of a biological mechanism, the-
ories are used to generate alternative accounts of the cor-
relation—which are then considered and compared. Just as
control groups can be used to eliminate alternative accounts
in group studies, documenting the effects (or lack thereof)
of variables associated with alternative accounts can be
used to narrow the range of interpretation.
In this article, we use results from our laboratories to
illustrate how individual differences can be exploited to
address three types of issues: (a) the nature of the neural
mechanisms that give rise to a speciﬁc type of cognitive
ability, (b) the role of psychological or biological mediators
of environmental challenges, and (c) the existence of bio-
logical processes that have nonadditive effects with behav-
ioral and physiological variables.
Insight Into Mechanisms
Rather than simply being noise that obscures underlying
causes of regularities in data, individual differences can
actually help to reveal the nature of underlying mecha-
nisms. We illustrate this point with an example of research
in a controversial area, mental imagery, where the addi-
tional leverage gained from this approach is particularly
important. Galton’s (1883) famous studies in the latter part
of the 19th century put the investigation of individual
differences in mental imagery at the core of experimental
psychology, and thus, it is ﬁtting that studies of individual
differences should play an important role in this ﬁeld today.
Cognitive and Brain Mechanisms in Mental
Imagery
In this section, we use mental imagery to illustrate how
investigating individual differences in the context of a
theory of general mechanisms can illuminate the nature of
internal representations. Mental imagery is the ability to
represent perceptual states in the absence of the appropriate
sensory input. Imagery can occur in any sensory modality,
including visual (as signaled by the experience of “seeing
in the mind’s eye”), auditory (accompanied by the experi-
ence of “hearing with the mind’s ear”), and motor (accom-
panied by the experience of “feeling the mind’s limb
move”). Mental images are in many respects surrogates for
percepts. For example, images can induce illusions like
those seen in perception (see, e.g., Finke & Schmidt, 1977,
1978; Kosslyn et al., 1999), visualizing an aversive object
can cause skin conductance increases like those found
when one actually views the object (see, e.g., Cuthbert,
Vrana, & Bradley, 1991; Lang, Cuthbert, & Bradley,
1998), and people may incorrectly remember having seen
an object when they in fact only visualized it (see, e.g.,
Johnson & Raye, 1981). None of these results is surprising
given that visual mental imagery and visual perception
activate about two thirds of the same brain areas (Kosslyn,
Thompson, & Alpert, 1997) and that memories of images
are crucial for the interpretation of perceptual input (see,
e.g., Ullman, 1996).
Nevertheless, studies of imagery remain controversial
(see, e.g., Denis & Kosslyn, 1999). Combining group and
individual differences approaches has proven useful for
addressing a key aspect of the controversy, namely,
whether a picturelike representation exists when one has
the experience of visualization. In an effort to support the
theory that visual mental images do in fact rely on a
depictive representation, Kosslyn and his colleagues (e.g.,
Kosslyn et al., 1993, 1999; Kosslyn, Thompson, Kim, &
Alpert, 1995) have reported that visual mental imagery
relies in part on the earliest visual cortices, Areas 17 and
18. These ﬁndings are important in part because these areas
are topographically organized—the pattern of light falling
on the retina is preserved by the pattern of activation on the
surface of the cortex. Distance across cortex is used to
represent distance across the object (or, more precisely,
across the planar projection of the perceptual image of the
object). However, activation of such areas does not always
occur during imagery (see, e.g., Mellet et al., 2000; Roland
& Gulyas, 1994; Thompson & Kosslyn, 2000).
Kosslyn, Thompson, Kim, Rauch, and Alpert (1996)
used individual differences in performance to provide con-
verging evidence that Area 17 plays a role in visual mental
imagery. In this study, participants closed their eyes and
received a series of auditory cues. Each trial had two
events: First, the participants heard the name of a letter of
the alphabet, at which point they were to visualize a stan-
dard uppercase version of the letter. Second, they held this
image for four seconds and then heard a cue, such as
“curved lines,” which named a possible property of the
letter. Their task was to decide, as quickly and accurately as
possible, whether the named property was present in the
letter being visualized. For example, they might hear “A
. . . curved lines.” In this case, the answer is no; in contrast,
for “B . . . curved lines,” the answer is yes. The response
times and accuracy were recorded. The participants were
tested in a positron emission tomography (PET) scanner,
which assessed cerebral blood ﬂow throughout their brains
as they performed the task. The more vigorously a part of
the brain worked during the task, the more blood was
present in that part.
In Kosslyn et al.’s (1996) study, the data were ana-
lyzed in an unusual way. Kosslyn et al. ﬁrst normalized the
blood-ﬂow data from all 16 participants, so that the mean
ﬂow was the same for each brain. For each participant, they
then calculated the blood ﬂow (relative to the normalized
mean) in a set of brain areas that, in previous group studies,
had been found to be activated during imagery. Finally,
they simply regressed the mean response time for each
person onto these measures of blood ﬂow. That is, data
from previous group studies were used to identify the brain
areas that are typically activated in common across partic-
ipants. Individual differences in the amount of such acti-
vation were then considered. Three ﬁndings are of interest.
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correlated with response times: The slowest people also
had the least amount of blood ﬂow (relative to their own
mean ﬂow) in Area 17. This ﬁnding is as expected if Area
17 is in fact involved in imagery, but that is merely a
correlation. Thus, the real strength of the ﬁnding comes
from the second result: It was possible to rule out a poten-
tial counterexplanation for the activation in Area 17 during
imagery—and perhaps to do so more effectively than
would have been possible with a standard group design.
Speciﬁcally, one could argue that this correlational result is
an artifact of a third variable, namely, blood ﬂow in another
brain area that was indirectly affecting blood ﬂow in Area
17. To rule out such an account, the amount of blood ﬂow
was measured in all areas of the brain that previously had
been found to be activated in the task, and the values for all
other areas were entered ﬁrst into a hierarchical multiple
regression analysis. The question is whether variations in
blood ﬂow in Area 17 still accounted for variations in
performance even after the contribution of these other areas
was statistically removed. In fact, individual differences in
blood ﬂow in Area 17 did continue to account for signiﬁ-
cant amounts of the variance in response times, which is
good evidence that the correlation between blood ﬂow in
Area 17 and performance was not an artifact of input from
the other brain areas. Thus, these ﬁndings provide strong
support for the view that Area 17 plays a functional role in
visual mental imagery. The combination of group and
individual differences approaches proved more powerful
than either would have alone.
Finally, only variation in blood ﬂow in certain brain
areas was correlated with performance; the correlations
picked out a set of areas that apparently are used in per-
forming the task. Indeed, perhaps the most remarkable
result is that the multiple correlation between blood ﬂow in
three areas and response time was r  .93; monitoring
individual differences in blood ﬂow in relevant brain areas
provides enormous power in predicting behavior. As dis-
cussed in the next section, individual differences not only
can be used to establish that a particular type of represen-
tation is used during a task (e.g., that which occurs in Area
17) but also can help identify the neural underpinnings of
such processing.
The Structure of Processing
Combining group and individual differences studies can
also provide insights into the nature of the system of
processes that gives rise to an ability. For example, studies
of individual differences have revealed that mental imagery
arises from a set of distinct processes working together. In
one such study, Kosslyn, Brunn, Cave, and Wallach (1984)
tested 50 people on 13 different imagery tasks. These tasks
were designed within the context of a theory that posited a
set of distinct processes, such as those underlying mental
rotation (visualizing objects changing orientation), image
scanning (shifting attention over an imaged object), image
generation (the ability to form images), and image resolu-
tion (how sharp objects appear in images). When perfor-
mance on the different tasks was correlated across partic-
ipants, the correlations were found to vary from .44 to
.79, clearly showing that imagery is not a single, undiffer-
entiated ability; if it were, the correlations should have
been consistent across tasks (Kosslyn, 1994). Instead, in-
dividual differences in imagery are best understood in
terms of a set of underlying processes, which are common
to all people but which vary for any given individual.
Indeed, the precise pattern of correlations was nicely ex-
plained by models that speciﬁed particular processes used
in each task (see, e.g., Kosslyn, Van Kleeck, & Kirby,
1990). Thus, group studies provided the basis for the the-
ory, which then led to models for speciﬁc tasks. The theory
could then be tested by ﬁtting the models to patterns of
individual differences. Unlike previous purely individual
differences studies, the tasks were designed and the results
analyzed in the context of the overarching theory; the
participants were not simply given a set of tests and the
results analyzed post hoc. Studying the underlying bases of
individual differences in this way provides insights into the
common structure of processing shared by all people—
which in turn provides insights into the precise ways in
which people differ.
If individual differences in brain activity can be used
to discover the underlying structure of processing, then one
might expect that variations in the activation of different
brain areas should predict behavior for different types of
tasks. In fact, Alexander et al. (1999) found a linear rela-
tionship between increased cerebral blood ﬂow in portions
of the occipital cortex plus the thalamus and accuracy in a
face-matching task. Nyberg, McIntosh, Houle, Nilsson, and
Tulving (1996) reported that the amount of activation a
participant had in the medial temporal lobe was correlated
with subsequent word-recognition performance. Cahill et
al. (1996) recorded activation while participants watched
emotional ﬁlms and found that the participants who had
stronger activation of the right amygdala later had better
memory for the ﬁlms. In short, variations in different
representations or processes underlie variations in the per-
formance of different tasks.
It is clear, then, that individual differences are not a
single, unitary factor. Moreover, they can be understood in
terms of variations in the efﬁcacy of representations and
processes that are shared by all members of a species.
Individual differences thus can be used in the context of
general theories of processing to help researchers discover
not only the nature of the representations and processes that
underlie an ability but also how speciﬁc representations and
processes are realized in the brain.
Mediators of Environmental
Challenges
Studying individual differences in the context of general
theories can also be exploited to understand why the same
stimuli evoke different responses in different people. In this
section, we illustrate this point by considering emotion, one
of the most salient characteristics of which is the fact that
the same emotional stimulus elicits a wide range of re-
sponses across individuals (Ekman & Davidson, 1994;
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ences in both the quality and the magnitude of the response
are the rule rather than the exception. Although many
studies have used self-report measures to probe such indi-
vidual differences, studies of the neural bases of individual
differences have provided crucial information about why
people react differently to the same emotion-inducing
situation.
Approach Versus Withdrawal
In this section, we illustrate how individual differences in
the activation of speciﬁc brain circuitry can deﬁne general
psychological dimensions that underlie emotion. Thus, in-
dividual differences are not studied for their own sake but
rather as a way to characterize species-general character-
istics—which, for emotion, Davidson and his colleagues
referred to as affective style. These general dimensions are
then used to explain why the same stimuli have different
effects for different individuals.
For example, Davidson and his colleagues (e.g., Da-
vidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & Friesen, 1990) showed
that when participants received stimuli that provoked
withdrawal-related negative affect, such as fear and dis-
gust, the right prefrontal regions of the brain became more
activated than the left (as measured by electroencephalog-
raphy). In contrast, when participants received stimuli that
evoked approach-related positive affect, the left prefrontal
regions became more activated. Moreover, these effects are
present within the ﬁrst year of life (Davidson & Fox, 1982).
On the basis of these and related ﬁndings, researchers
reasoned that individual differences in the baseline
amounts of activation in the left versus right prefrontal
regions could mediate the effects of environmental stimuli.
To test this prediction, the researchers ﬁrst had to establish
that baseline measures of prefrontal activation asymmetry
are stable over time and exhibit adequate statistical reli-
ability. Such tests are rarely conducted with biological
measures but are crucial: It is not obvious which biological
measures are reliable enough to be used to assess individual
differences. In the most comprehensive study, Tomarken,
Davidson, Wheeler, and Kinney (1992) examined both the
internal consistency reliability and test–retest stability
(over approximately one month) in a large number of
participants (N  90). They found excellent internal con-
sistency reliability ( .9) and adequate test–retest stability
(intraclass correlations between .65 and .75) for brain elec-
trical activity measures of prefrontal activation asymmetry.
If, in fact, the left prefrontal regions mediate approach
emotions and the right prefrontal regions mediate with-
drawal emotions, then participants with greater baseline
right-sided prefrontal activation should report greater dis-
positional negative affect on a standard paper-and-pencil
measure. The data supported the prediction (Tomarken,
Davidson, Wheeler, & Doss, 1992; see also Sutton &
Davidson, 1997).
In addition to examining relations between brain elec-
trical measures of prefrontal activation and self-report mea-
sures of affective traits, Davidson and his colleagues have
also explored whether such individual differences in base-
line measures of brain function predict reactivity to
emotion-charged stimuli. In several studies, they found that
measures of baseline prefrontal activation predicted how
strongly individuals reacted to emotional ﬁlm clips (Hen-
riques & Davidson, 1990; Tomarken, Davidson, & Hen-
riques, 1990; Wheeler, Davidson, & Tomarken, 1993); as
expected, participants with greater right-sided prefrontal
activation reported stronger negative affect in response to
negative affective ﬁlm clips, even after the statistical re-
moval of variance associated with trait levels of negative
affect. Indeed, measures of baseline prefrontal function
even predicted how strongly 10-month-old infants reacted
to a brief episode of maternal separation: Infants with
greater right-sided prefrontal activation at baseline were
more likely to cry in response to maternal separation com-
pared with their left-activated counterparts (Davidson &
Fox, 1982).
Davidson and colleagues have extended this research
program by examining individual differences in brain elec-
trical measures of prefrontal activation and emotional re-
sponses in rhesus monkeys (Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin,
2000; Davidson, Kalin, & Shelton, 1992, 1993; Kalin,
Larson, Shelton, & Davidson, 1998). These researchers
found that the test–retest stability of their measures of
prefrontal function is comparable in monkeys and humans.
Moreover, monkeys with greater right-sided prefrontal ac-
tivation had higher levels of cortisol (Kalin, Shelton, Rick-
man, & Davidson, 1998). Cortisol is a stress hormone that
readies the body to engage in ﬁght or ﬂight; it stimulates
secretion of intracellular glucose into the blood, which
allows one to respond vigorously over a longer period of
time. Indeed, animals with greater right-sided prefrontal
activation also had higher cerebrospinal ﬂuid levels of
corticotropin-releasing hormone, a key molecule produced
in the hypothalamus in the series of events that ultimately
releases cortisol (Kalin, Shelton, & Davidson, 2000). The
fact that chronic differences in prefrontal activation predict
levels of cortisol is important for a number reasons—not
the least of which is that long-term elevation of cortisol can
kill hippocampal neurons (see, e.g., Sapolsky, 1992, 1996).
The results from studies of monkeys almost certainly
generalize to humans. For example, Lovallo and colleagues
found that participants whose heart rates changed dramat-
ically during a painful cold-pressor test also had large
cardiovascular and cortisol responses in a threatening
reaction-time task 2 weeks to 13 months earlier (Lovallo,
Pincomb, & Wilson, 1986). One might question whether
such differences in reactivity arise from central or periph-
eral mechanisms. Lovallo and colleagues next measured
adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH), the physiological
precursor of cortisol secreted by the pituitary gland and
triggered by corticotropin-releasing hormone. They found
that people who had the highest heart rate responses to a
social stressor, public speaking, also had greater negative
affect along with elevated sympathetic reactivity, ACTH,
and cortisol responses (al’Absi et al., 1997). The relations
among these individual differences are good evidence for a
common mediator, and the brain is the only candidate for
such a mechanism. These studies suggest that emotional
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players in this biological response tendency.
The examination of individual differences within the
context of theories of general mechanisms has also re-
vealed another important mediator of the effects of emo-
tional stimuli: amygdala function, both at baseline and in
response to affective stimuli. Previous studies have shown
that the amygdala is activated by aversive stimuli, and thus,
a framework has been established for asking whether indi-
vidual differences in such activation are related to differ-
ences in behavior. Using PET with ﬂuro-deoxyglucose, in
conjunction with magnetic resonance imaging coregistra-
tion and anatomically deﬁned regions of interest, research-
ers have assessed the metabolic rate in the amygdala and
several related subcortical structures. For most, but not all,
regions examined, test–retest stability was good (Schaefer
et al., 2000). In a study of depressed patients (all of whom
were off medication at the time of testing; Abercrombie et
al., 1998), those patients who had greater metabolic rates in
the right amygdala also reported more dispositional nega-
tive affect (with the values of the correlations between .40
and .55). It is possible, as Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke,
and Putnam (2002) suggested, that the amygdala activation
in depressed patients could arise from comorbid anxiety
and related negative affect instead of depression per se.
Although the depressed patients in the Abercrombie et al.
(1998) study were speciﬁcally screened to eliminate con-
current anxiety disorders, with the exception of social
phobia, such patients are still likely to have considerable
comorbid anxiety. In a series of studies, Drevets and co-
workers found that depressed patients had elevated baseline
blood ﬂow and metabolism in the amygdala (Drevets,
2001; Drevets et al., 1992). However, these participants all
were patients with familial major depressive disorder (i.e.,
all had ﬁrst-degree relatives with the disorder) or were
patients with melancholic features.
More recently, Irwin et al. (2001) asked a conceptu-
ally similar question using functional magnetic resonance
imaging in normal participants. They examined the signal
in the right amygdala elicited by negative versus neutral
pictures. When averaged over participants, negative pic-
tures did indeed produce a signiﬁcant increase in the amyg-
dala signal compared with neutral pictures. However, the
magnitude of this response differed considerably across
participants. When such variation was considered in its
own right, instead of being considered noise and ignored,
the researchers found that participants who had a larger
amygdala signal in response to the negative pictures re-
ported higher levels of dispositional negative affect (r 
.61).
In short, the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala each
have been implicated in mediating speciﬁc aspects of emo-
tion. These ﬁndings characterize people in general, but
armed with such results, one can now turn to the individ-
ual—and by studying individual differences, one can in
turn garner additional evidence for the fundamental distinc-
tions. Speciﬁcally, participants with greater right-sided pre-
frontal activation at baseline have reported more disposi-
tional negative affect, have reacted more negatively to
aversive stimuli, and have had the biological hallmarks of
greater stress. Similar ﬁndings have been obtained with the
amygdala: When the right amygdala has had a high base-
line metabolic rate and has been highly reactive to unpleas-
ant pictures, participants have reported higher levels of
dispositional negative affect. However, we note that the
issue of asymmetries in amygdala activation has proven
complicated and is not yet fully understood (see Davidson
& Irwin, 1999; LeDoux, 2002, for reviews). The approach
advocated here clearly can be used to discover the bases of
asymmetries, and we fully expect that additional studies
will iron out wrinkles that have appeared in the literature
(with some studies reporting asymmetries in amygdala
activation and some not).
Dispositional Mood
Considering individual differences within the context of a
general theory can also help forge the connection from
psychology to biology for another aspect of emotion, which
has been called dispositional mood. For example, Hugdahl,
Beneventi, and Halvorsen (2002) investigated the possibil-
ity that dispositional mood reﬂects how easily one can be
negatively conditioned. Classical conditioning affects all
animals, but—like everything else—there is interindividual
variation in its effectiveness. This variation can be ex-
ploited to help understand the nature of dispositional mood.
First, to assess dispositional mood, Hugdahl et al.
(2002) obtained scores on the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The
PANAS consists of statements about negative (e.g., “agi-
tated”) and positive (e.g., “enthusiastic”) feelings, and the
participants indicate the extent to which each statement is
characteristic of their dispositional mood. Although the
PANAS measures types of activated mood, Hugdahl and
colleagues focused on the positive and negative affect
dimension, which reﬂects robust properties of self-rated
affect (Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). Next,
Hugdahl et al. (2002) asked people to complete the PANAS
scale and then to participate in a conditioning experiment in
which a neutral tone was given affective value by pairing it
with aversive pictures several times. The researchers re-
corded psychophysiological responses to the tone from the
sweat glands in the skin of the palms. The participants
heard two different tones, one at 500 Hz and the other at
1000 Hz. Half the participants received the 500-Hz tone as
the conditioned stimulus and the 1000-Hz tone as an un-
conditioned stimulus, and vice versa for the other half of
the participants. Conditioning was thus measured as the
difference in skin response to the conditioned tone versus
the unconditioned tone.
The hypothesis was that if people who have more
negative dispositional mood are more easily negatively
conditioned, then participants who rated themselves more
negatively should also be more strongly conditioned in this
procedure. By the same token, the correlation should be
attenuated (or even reversed) for those who rated them-
selves as more positive. In fact, participants who rated
themselves as having negative dispositional mood, as indi-
cated by the negative PANAS items, had larger skin con-
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. 55, p  .03); the corresponding correlation for the posi-
tive PANAS items was not signiﬁcant. Thus, using indi-
vidual differences within the context of species-general
mechanisms, researchers can link aspects of personality
and temperament to psychophysiology. In fact, perhaps sur-
prisingly, people can accurately report aspects of their tem-
peraments that reﬂect the state of their nervous systems
(see Hugdahl, 1995, for a review of psychophysiological
studies of emotions).
In sum, the study of individual differences within the
context of knowledge of general mechanisms has further
shown how those mechanisms may mediate one’s emo-
tional response to environmental events. Studying the in-
terplay between group-based research and individual dif-
ferences research has proven to be a particularly powerful
way to connect emotional phenomena to their underlying
biological substrata.
Nonadditive Effects
Studying individual differences within the context of the-
ories of general mechanisms may also provide a handle on
one of the knottier problems in psychology: understanding
nonadditive effects of different variables. That is, not only
may the effects of one variable alter the effects of another
but also the precise degree to which the variables interact
may depend on their values. Instead of considering how
individual differences mediate the effects of a stimulus, we
now consider how individual differences in one process in
turn affect the operation of another process.
Modulating the Stress Response
In this section, we consider individual differences that
modulate the brain and bodily responses to stress. As noted
earlier, cortisol rises in response to stress, readying the
body to engage in ﬁght or ﬂight (Lovallo, 1997; Sapolsky,
1992, 1996). Yet cortisol does not always increase in
response to a threat, and when it does increase, it may
increase to different degrees. In this section, we illustrate
how group analyses have obscured the nature of biological
responses to stress and how the actual nature of these
responses becomes apparent only when individual differ-
ences are also considered. In the present approach, the link
from psychology to biology depends critically on charac-
terizing individual differences in the functioning of mech-
anisms shared by all human beings.
An initial wave of studies showed that acute psycho-
logical stressors activate the autonomic nervous system and
the sympathetic adrenomedullary system axis but not the
hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenocortical axis (Manuck, Co-
hen, Rabin, Muldoon, & Bachen, 1991; see reviews by
Benschop et al., 1998; Kiecolt-Glaser, Cacioppo, Malar-
key, & Glaser, 1992). Cacioppo, Berntson, and colleagues
(see, e.g., Berntson et al., 1994; Cacioppo, 1994; Cacioppo
et al., 1995, 1998) asked whether the methodologies used
previously had led researchers to overlook the role of the
hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenocortical system in response
to stress. They combined group and individual differences
approaches to address this question. For example, in one
study, researchers identiﬁed individuals who were high or
low in sympathetic cardiac activation (Sgoutas-Emch et al.,
1994). The researchers ﬁrst monitored heart rate and blood
pressure while participants performed a brief public-speak-
ing task (Saab, Matthews, Stoney, & McDonald, 1989);
after conﬁrming the internal consistency of the cardiovas-
cular measures and the fact that the speech stressor signif-
icantly elevated cardiovascular activity, the researchers
identiﬁed individuals in the top or bottom quartiles in heart
rate reactivity during the speech task. To control for pos-
sible confounds, the researchers conducted ancillary anal-
yses to ensure that high and low reactors had similar basal
heart rates and health behaviors.
These individuals then were recruited to participate in
a follow-up study. The participants relaxed for 5 minutes
(the baseline) and then performed mental arithmetic for 12
minutes (the stressor task). During the last 6 minutes of the
stressor task, the participants heard random 100-dB noise
bursts, which they were told were presented “to make the
task more challenging.” The researchers collected cardio-
vascular measures throughout and drew blood prior to and
following the stressor. Preliminary analyses conﬁrmed that
individual differences in cardiovascular reactivity were
maintained across the two testing sessions and that high
heart rate reactors in the screening session also had larger
heart rate increases to the mental arithmetic stressor. In
addition, the researchers replicated prior research showing
that the brief psychological stressor increased circulating
catecholamine levels but not cortisol levels. This was the
ﬁnding that had led others to suggest that brief psycholog-
ical stressors activated the sympathetic adrenomedullary
system but not the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenocortical
system.
However, for present purposes, the important point is
that when the high and low heart rate reactors’ neuroendo-
crine responses to stressors were compared, a different
pattern emerged. Speciﬁcally, the mental arithmetic task
elevated catecholamine levels comparably for low and high
heart rate reactors whereas the high heart rate reactors had
higher stress-related levels of plasma cortisol than did the
low reactors. In short, the effects of stress were modulated
by the participants’ level of reactivity—which was only
apparent when individual differences were taken into ac-
count (Berntson et al., 1994).
Having documented this interaction, the researchers
then exploited individual differences to study the mecha-
nisms responsible for the observed ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally,
these researchers examined the neural substrates of heart
rate responses to a nonpsychological (i.e., orthostatic)
stressor and to three active coping (i.e., mental arithmetic,
speech, reaction time) stressors. The same high and low
reactors were tested under sympathetic blockade, parasym-
pathetic blockade, double blockade, and placebo. Group
analyses revealed that the psychological and nonpsycho-
logical stressors produced comparable sympathetic activa-
tion and reciprocal vagal withdrawal. Examining individual
differences within this framework, in contrast, revealed that
the orthostatic stressor operated differently on the brain and
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stressor, which acts through the baroreceptor reﬂex to
maintain blood pressure when one changes posture, pro-
duced sympathetic activation and vagal withdrawal in all of
the participants. In contrast, the three active coping stres-
sors elicited consistent patterns of sympathetic and vagal
changes within individuals but had very different patterns
for different people. The different responses to the two
types of stressors are good evidence that different mecha-
nisms are at work. In fact, psychological stressors are
modulated by more rostral brain systems, which are not
used in other forms of cardiac control.
An important implication of this work is that sympa-
thetic cardiac activation, and not heart rate reactivity per se,
may predict whether the hypothalamic–pituitary–adreno-
cortical system reacts in response to stress (cf. al’Absi et
al., 1997; al’Absi, Hugdahl, & Lovallo, in press; Cacioppo,
1994; Cacioppo et al., 1995; Lovallo, Pincomb, Brackett, &
Wilson, 1990; Uchino, Cacioppo, Malarkey, & Glaser,
1995). This idea has been pursued in additional research.
For example, in one study, 22 elderly women relaxed for 30
minutes, then participated in a 5-minute baseline period, a
6-minute mental arithmetic task, and a 6-minute speech
task. Cacioppo and colleagues recorded autonomic activity
during the baseline and stressor periods and drew blood at
baseline, midstressor, and poststressor (Cacioppo et al.,
1995). Replicating prior studies, group analyses indicated
that the psychological stressor not only elevated heart rate
but also elevated catecholamine (epinephrine and norepi-
nephrine) plasma levels—but did not alter circulating cor-
tisol levels. In contrast, individual differences analyses
revealed that the higher a participant’s sympathetic cardiac
reactivity, the greater the stress-induced changes in plasma
cortisol concentrations (r  .62). In contrast, vagal car-
diac reactivity was unrelated to cortisol responses (r 
.18). This is precisely the pattern of results one would
expect if sympathetic reactivity were underlying the rela-
tionship between heart rate reactivity and cortisol. More-
over, hierarchical regression analyses revealed that brief
psychological stressors have an impact on the hypothalamic–
pituitary–adrenocortical system not only in some situations
but in some situations for some individuals—speciﬁcally,
those in whom sympathetic cardiac reactivity is also high.
This research not only illustrates the conditions in
which the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenocortical system is
involved in stress, and thus illuminates the nature of the
fundamental system, but also helps explain relations among
systems. When individual differences were added to a
standard design, key relations emerged that otherwise
would have been masked.
Cognitive Effects of Stress
Individual differences in stress-related elevations of corti-
sol are important for a variety of reasons, one of which is
that cortisol may affect cognitive functioning. In this sec-
tion, we illustrate such interactions by considering the
effect of acutely elevated levels of cortisol on dichotic
listening (al’Absi et al., in press). Again, we consider how
individual differences in one system in turn affect the
functioning of another. Participants who had large cortisol
responses during mental arithmetic and a public-speaking
task were better 30 minutes later at dichotic listening in
comparison with those who had low cortisol responses.
Dichotic listening requires sustained focused attention to
external stimuli, which is usually considered the purview of
executive processes in working memory. Thus, it is of great
interest that working memory depends on adequate func-
tioning of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Smith &
Jonides, 1999), an area richly supplied with corticosteroid
receptors and corticotropin-releasing factor terminals.
If only group data had been considered, the effects of
stress on cognitive function would have appeared negligi-
ble. By respecting individual differences, not only were
systematic effects documented but also their implications
for theories of processing in general became clear. The
combination of both sorts of factors, considering individual
differences but doing so within the context of general
mechanisms, allowed the researchers to build a bridge from
the psychological effect to the underlying biological
substrate.
Modulating the Immune Response
We have seen that studying individual differences can
illuminate links from psychological events to three sorts of
biological events: central nervous system activity (both
cortical and subcortical), autonomic nervous system activ-
ity, and neuroendocrine activity. In addition, in this section,
we show how this approach can illuminate key facts about
the link between psychological events and the immune
system. For example, dispositional differences in the ef-
fects of stress on the immune system rely in part on the
presence of social support (Cacioppo, 1994; Cacioppo et
al., 2000). Much of the research on the effect of stress on
the immune system has focused on natural killer (NK)
cells. This special class of lymphocytes attacks and kills
target cells, such as tumor cells (Herberman & Ortaldo,
1981; Roder & Pross, 1982). In normal, healthy humans,
NK cells represent from 5% to 15% of circulating lympho-
cytes (Whiteside & Herberman, 1994). Both the number of
circulating NK cells in the blood and the efﬁciency with
which the cells actually kill target cells (NK cell cytotoxic
activity [NKCA]) are important indicators of a healthy
immune system and tend to be relatively stable within an
individual over time (Whiteside & Herberman, 1989,
1994). Persistently low numbers of NK cells and low
NKCA can be associated with chronic stress or disease,
such as the progression or recurrence of cancer (Ben-
Eliyahu, Yirmiya, Liebeskind, Taylor, & Gale, 1991; Levy,
Herberman, Lippman, D’Angelo, & Lee, 1991; Whiteside
& Herberman, 1995). However, NK levels can also change
quickly in response to a particular challenge, such as a cold
virus or an acute stressor (Whiteside & Herberman, 1989).
In a laboratory study of the effects of uncontrollable
noise (Sieber et al., 1992), participants who perceived
themselves as having no control over a stressful noise had
suppressed NK activity, both immediately following the
task and 72 hours later. On the other hand, participants who
believed they had control over the noise (although they did
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not show immune suppression. However, participants who
reported a high desire for control, as assessed by a person-
ality questionnaire, showed the largest drop in NKCA in
the no-control condition. Thus, personality variables may
accentuate a participant’s response to an uncontrollable
stressor, thereby inﬂuencing the effect on NKCA.
In addition, stress induced by examinations decreases
NK cell number and activity (Glaser et al., 1985; Kiecolt-
Glaser et al., 1984, 1986). In one study, researchers as-
sessed ﬁrst-year medical students one month before and
immediately after taking ﬁnal exams. NK cell number and
NKCA dropped following the exams. However, these ef-
fects were even worse for students who reported more
loneliness and higher subjective stress ratings; these stu-
dents had lower NKCA (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1984), sug-
gesting again that stress-induced suppression of NKCA is
modulated by the person’s emotional reaction to a stressor
and is buffered by the presence of social support. In a
related study, students who had greater levels of right
prefrontal activation at baseline had lower NKCA follow-
ing ﬁnal exams (Davidson, Coe, Dolski, & Donzella,
1999).
Researchers have obtained converging evidence by
studying the effects of separation and divorce, which have
emotional and immunological consequences (cf. Bloom,
Asher, & White, 1978). For example, Kiecolt-Glaser et al.
(1987) compared a group of separated and divorced women
with a group of married women who were sociodemo-
graphically matched. Women who were tested within a
year of being separated or divorced had the greatest im-
mune deﬁciency, having lower percentages of helper T
lymphocytes and NK cells and higher Epstein-Barr virus
antibody titers. The largest decreases in immune responses
were for women who had been separated most recently and
who remained emotionally attached to their former mates.
However, women who had been separated or divorced for
up to six years continued to show evidence of immunosup-
pression. Furthermore, poorer marital quality in the married
group was associated with decreased immune function.
These results suggest that the different phases in the dis-
ruption of a marital relationship can lead to long-term
immunosuppression.
In addition, the clinical salience of disruption of mar-
ital support is illustrated by a study of metastatic breast-
cancer patients, which found that those who were divorced,
separated, or widowed had disrupted cortisol secretion;
these patients no longer had normal diurnal variation in
cortisol and instead had increased rather than the usual
decreased amounts throughout the course of the day. This
pattern predicted signiﬁcantly earlier subsequent mortality
in the ensuing seven years (Sephton, Sapolsky, Kraemer, &
Spiegel, 2000). Thus, variability in social support may
contribute to immune and endocrine effects of acute and
chronic stress that play important roles in health.
In short, studies of individual differences have al-
lowed researchers to understand not only which biological
mechanisms are called into play during psychological
events but also how such mechanisms interact. By averag-
ing data from different types of people, key aspects of how
psychology is linked to biology have been obscured. With-
out question, studying individual differences can clarify
what previously have been muddy waters.
General Discussion
We have advocated combining group-based research and
individual differences research as a powerful method for
linking psychology to biology. In the present approach,
unlike most group-based research, individual differences
are not treated as noise. Moreover, unlike much individual
differences research, the measures are tightly linked to
mechanisms that characterize the group as a whole. The
examples presented here serve to underline the strengths
and weaknesses of the two traditional methods. First, we
have seen numerous examples where a strictly group-based
approach failed to reveal aspects of the underlying biolog-
ical mechanisms. For example, a main effect, documenting
the existence of a phenomenon, may not be revealed if
there is considerable variation within a population in the
tendency or ability to use it. Thus, a Type II error can occur
if individual variance is not taken into account.
Second, we must note that studying individual differ-
ences without considering a species-general mechanism or
theoretical framework is not adequate. Consider the neu-
roimaging studies noted throughout this article. In every
case, the researchers knew in advance which brain areas to
examine (such as the amygdala or Area 17). They knew
this on the basis of prior group studies. Such studies pro-
vide the framework within which one can ask about indi-
vidual differences. In addition and perhaps more important,
correlations with performance reﬂect only a subset of the
processes used in a given task. By analogy, consider indi-
vidual differences in typing speed. Variation in perfor-
mance of this task reﬂects individual differences in the
speed with which one can set up and execute motor pro-
grams but does not reﬂect individual differences in the
strength of one’s ﬁngers (assuming that the keyboard is
properly designed). If one has a certain threshold level of
strength, that is sufﬁcient—any additional strength is irrel-
evant. Similarly, for many mental processes, if one can
accomplish the process at all, that is good enough to
perform the task well—and thus, individual differences in
the efﬁcacy of that process are not correlated with individ-
ual differences in performance. Correlations reveal only
processes that are rate limiting, that is, for which improve-
ments in the efﬁcacy of the process are reﬂected by im-
provements in performance (see Kosslyn & Plomin, 2001).
Neither group nor individual differences research
alone is sufﬁcient; researchers need to combine the two.
Indeed, by combining the two, one may discover that the
group results reﬂect the combination of several strategies,
each of which draws on a different (or partially different)
system. Thus, the group and individual differences ﬁndings
mutually inform each other, with the synergy between them
illuminating the complex relations between psychology
and biology.
Our aim has been to illustrate three ways that the
combined approach can help illuminate the link between
348 May 2002 ● American Psychologistpsychology and biology (the nature of mechanisms, the
role of psychological or biological mediators of a situa-
tional factor, and the ways systems interact to produce
nonadditive effects among variables). Thus, we have se-
lected our examples to address the four basic biological
systems that are relevant for psychology: the central ner-
vous system, the autonomic nervous system, the neuroen-
docrine system, and the neuroimmune system. Consider
each in turn: First and foremost, consider the central ner-
vous system. It is clear that neuroimaging offers the prom-
ise of discovering how mental events arise in the brain. We
hope to have shown here that the combination of group and
individual differences methods can play a key role in
helping fulﬁll that promise. Second, the autonomic nervous
system plays a key role in survival. We have shown how
individual differences provide a tool for studying auto-
nomic reactivity (as reﬂected in the ease of being condi-
tioned), which in turn allows an understanding of the
general psychological construct of dispositional mood in
greater depth. Third, the neuroendocrine system is crucial
for regulating the body, which both is regulated by the
brain and in turn affects the brain; this system is key in
allowing human beings to cope with stress. The hybrid
approach we suggest here not only has allowed researchers
to illuminate how this system works but also underscores
important limitations of a strictly group-based approach.
Finally, the neuroimmune system plays a central role in
allowing the mind to affect health. It is clear that personal
characteristics modulate the effects of stressors on the
immune system.
With the completion of the Human Genome Project,
the time is particularly ripe for research of the sort we
advocate here. The study of individual differences affords
an opportunity to link psychological characteristics to ge-
netics. Most research in behavioral genetics has focused on
similarities and differences in some characteristic or ability
among people who share different percentages of common
genes (Plomin, DeFries, McClearn, & Rutter, 1997). With
the advent of the Human Genome Project, it has become
increasingly practical to link the presence or absence of
particular genes to speciﬁc characteristics. Such research
rests on prior characterization of individual differences
among people.
In addition, linking psychology to biology in a way
that respects individual differences may have profound
implications for psychotherapy. Different treatments may
be more or less appropriate for different people. For exam-
ple, some people may—perhaps because of their genet-
ics—resist some types of conditioning, be particularly vul-
nerable to lack of social support, or have difﬁculty forming
vivid imagery, and so on. By discovering the proclivities of
a given person, it is even possible that psychologists can
customize interventions to help a patient gain control over
his or her health. Mental events clearly affect the sys-
tems—autonomic, endocrine, and immune—that underlie
health. This goal is admittedly barely in sight, but the path
to it is becoming clearer. A key aspect of this journey will
be to characterize individual differences rigorously, in
ways presaged by the examples offered here.
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